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ABSTRACT 
FUNKHOUSER, SHANNON    Theory of mind, temperament, and 
    prosocial behavior in preschoolers. Department of Psychology, June 2011. 
ADVISOR: Linda Stanhope 
Theory of mind is the ability to understand that others have thoughts, beliefs, or ideas 
that differ from one’s own. This study investigated the relationship between theory-
of-mind and prosocial behavior in 42 preschoolers. Prosocial behavior is defined as 
voluntary actions intended to benefit another. The role of temperament was also 
examined in terms of the relationship between prosocial behavior and theory of mind. 
The researcher went to two preschools and administered a battery of seven theory-of-
mind tasks individually to each child (Wellman & Lui, 2004). Parents completed a 
temperament questionnaire measuring emotionality, activity, sociability, and shyness. 
Teachers rated each child’s prosocial behavior. It was hypothesized that prosocial 
behavior would positively correlate with theory-of-mind skills; this was not 
supported. It was also hypothesized that theory-of-mind and prosocial behavior would 
correlate positively with the temperament dimension of sociability, and would 
correlate negatively with the dimensions of shyness and emotionality. However, only 
emotionality correlated with theory of mind, with more emotional children having 
significantly lower theory-of-mind scores. More active children were rated as more 
prosocial, while those who were more shy were less prosocial. Results are discussed 
in terms of adapting children’s environments to accommodate their temperaments and 
promote prosocial and theory-of-mind development.
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Theory of Mind, Temperament, and Prosocial Behavior in Preschoolers 
 Human interaction is at the heart of our relationships, a phenomenon in which 
we engage almost constantly, and on a daily basis. What allows for the kind of 
interpersonal awareness and understanding that is necessary for creating and 
maintaining bonds among two or more people is a very unique and complex form of 
perspective-taking. This perspective-taking ability is called a theory of mind, and it 
describes one’s ability to recognize and understand that other people have thoughts, 
feelings, beliefs, and desires that may differ from one’s own. We use this ability in 
incredibly subtle, oftentimes largely unconscious ways, to formulate our thoughts and 
judgments about others, and the reasons behind their words and actions. Without a 
theory of mind, we would be unable to engage in the crucial functions that allow 
human relationships to become so complex and profound; theory of mind abilities 
contribute to our capacity to empathize with others, to understand and respond to 
others’ needs or wants, to impute and predict others’ future actions and/or behavior, 
and to detect and take action to correct others’ misunderstandings. Indeed, one could 
go so far as to say that theory of mind, and its related social and cognitive functions, 
are the means that give us the power to dictate the nature of all of our relationships, 
whether brief and transient, or deep and enduring. 
 Because of the importance of theory of mind to our skills in navigating the 
world of human interaction and relationship, it is important to study how and when 
this ability develops, and what sorts of factors promote and inhibit its healthy growth 
within individuals. Theory of mind development in fact begins at a very young age, as 
early as two-and-a-half years, and by the preschool ages of three and four years, and 
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the kindergarten age of five years, an incredible amount of crucial further 
development is takeing place. The preschool classroom is an environment ripe with 
opportunities for social interaction, and the creation and maintenance of children’s 
first concrete friendships. The peer relations that take place during these years in a 
child’s life are critical for their future development, and so it is important to 
investigate thoroughly how theory of mind abilities affect and are affected by the 
intricate interaction of factors such as individual characteristics, experiences, and 
temperament. Through investigation of this nature, we can begin to understand how 
the significant social experiences of preschoolers are generated, and appreciate the 
complexity of the evolution of a theory of mind in humans. The current study was 
conducted in an effort to explore how children’s development of theory of mind, their 
temperaments, and their prosocial behavior are related.  
Premack and Woodruff (1978) first described theory of mind as the ability to 
attribute mental states to oneself and to others. The researchers wanted to explore the 
possibility that chimpanzees have a theory of mind that does not differ dramatically 
from that of humans. They elaborated on their concept of theory of mind as a “system 
of inferences” pertaining to states that are internal, and therefore not openly visible or 
observable, and from which one can begin to form predictions about the behavior of a 
certain organism (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  The most common inferences 
humans make about the mental states of others are purpose and/or intention. 
However, there are many other states that humans attribute to others just as 
frequently, including belief - Susie believes in luck; doubt - John doubts that his team 
will win the game; pretending - They are only pretending; knowledge - She knows the 
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answer; thinking - Mark thinks he is correct; guessing - He is only guessing; and like - 
Janet likes chocolate (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). There are, of course, many 
significant states not mentioned in the above list, and inferences about mental states 
can become quite complex; it is not difficult to imagine how extensive the list would 
be if it accurately reflected the incredibly diverse spectrum of human mental states. 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) did find that theory of mind is present in apes, and 
concluded their study by stating that a theory of mind is also a universal function of 
human adults. However, the researchers also pointed out the importance of looking at 
another very important population: children. What, they asked, is the developmental 
pathway of theory of mind for a normally developing child? 
 The earliest studies conducted to test children’s understanding of theory of 
mind used a variety of different methods, but it was Wimmer and Perner (1983) who 
created a more standard method for operationalizing and testing the theory. In seeking 
to determine at which age children develop a viable theory of mind, the researchers 
utilized a method involving a doll named “Maxi” who sees a chocolate bar being put 
into one of two cabinets. Maxi then leaves the room and is therefore absent at the 
critical moment when the chocolate bar is moved into the other cabinet. Those 
children who possess the ability to keep track of the location of the chocolate bar, 
and, simultaneously, understand that “Maxi,” who was not in the room when the 
chocolate bar was moved, has no reason to believe that it is not still in the original 
cabinet, would need to have some measure of understanding of false belief, and 
therefore some theory of mind (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The researchers found that 
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children under the age of four regularly failed this task, and were rarely able to 
acknowledge that Maxi would be misinformed in the situation.  
 While these and other findings seem to suggest that children younger than 
four years do not possess the cognitive abilities necessary for a system of beliefs 
about beliefs, criticisms have been made regarding certain attributes of Wimmer and 
Perner’s (1983) “unexpected transfer” procedure described above. These critics 
suggest that the task fails to differentiate between the active ability to consider beliefs 
about beliefs and the completely separate and more complex ability to verbalize and 
explain this understanding, and that the “unexpected transfer” task is more convoluted 
and overly-computational than is practical or necessary (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 
1989). Young children have difficulty grasping hypothetical situations, and this fact 
combined with the complicated story lines portrayed in the task could be a better 
explanation for the children’s poor performance, rather than a lack of theory of mind. 
It is important to consider carefully the possibility that young children may entertain 
complicated thoughts about others’ mental lives before they possess the ability to 
communicate these thoughts, especially in situations with hypothetical story 
characters and situations.  
There have been studies conducted showing that even children as young as 
two-and-a-half display the ability to utilize effectively certain tactics with the goal of 
deceiving another person (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989). The tactics employed by 
the children require that they possess a consciousness that false beliefs can and do 
exist, and therefore they assume that some measure of theory of mind is already 
operative in children of this age. Research has also cited the fact that children as 
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young as two years old display the ability to differentiate between the real and the 
pretend (Leslie, 1988), and that children of this age frequently use mental state 
words/phrases and concepts (Wellman, 1988). These findings provide additional 
evidence for the presence of a very early development of theory of mind, and they 
show that even two- and three-year-olds hold some measure of theory-like 
comprehension of others’ minds.  
 Chandler, Fritz, and Hala (1989) set out to design a procedure to test theory of 
mind in young children that did not depend on Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) use of 
complicated narratives and the communication of who knows what about whom. The 
researchers sought to create an assessment that would focus more on whether subjects 
could actively engage in theory of mind-type thinking, rather than whether they could 
tell about theory of mind-type thinking. This revision manifested itself in an 
exploration of subjects’ abilities to engage in deceptive behaviors. It is believed that if 
one deliberately alters or makes up information with the intention of deceiving 
another into believing something to be true which one knows to be false, then it is 
appropriate to say that one has theory of mind (Anderson, 1986). Chandler et. al.’s 
(1989) study was therefore designed to test whether two-, three-, and four-year-old 
children have the capacity to display deceitful behaviors that reflect their ability to 
actively comprehend the states of others and the ability of others to be misled and to 
possess false beliefs. The task they developed to test this was a “hide-and-seek” board 
game wherein the child was asked to hide a “treasure,” or a small bag of gold 
coins/jewels from one of the researcherswho left the room for a certain period of 
time. They were told to choose a hiding place for the treasure from a variety of 
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different colored containers, and to utilize the help of a puppet. The movement of the 
puppet on the playing board was tracked with his ink footprints on a white surface 
(Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989). What the researchers found after conducting several 
trials utilizing the game to test subjects’ abilities to think and act deceptively 
confirmed without a doubt that children as young as two-and-a-half years already 
make use of an array of deceptive tactics that assume a working false belief 
comprehension. In fact, only one of the 30 subjects younger than the three- to six-
year-old group did not engage in any actions designed to mislead others. These types 
of actions consisted of getting rid of incriminating evidence (wiping away the 
puppet’s footprints which led right to the container in which the treasure was hidden), 
or utilizing deceptive verbal and/or behavioral clues in order to conceal the true 
hiding place of the treasure. A remarkable number of two- and three-year-olds (90%) 
took steps to mislead purposefully others, and thus it is clear that children of this age 
possess the early stages of a theory of mind (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989). 
 Chandler, Fritz, & Hala decided to conduct another study in 1991 in order to 
replicate and validate their findings about young children and their theory of mind 
capabilities (Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991). This study involved three studies with 70 
three- and four-year-olds, and again sought to determine whether children below the 
age of four possess the ability to understand false belief, and therefore a theory of 
mind in the very early stages of development. The researchers again utilized the 
measure of deceptive hiding used in their previous study, and they again found that 
three-year-olds do already have a theory of mind developed enough to enable them to 
understand that other people have beliefs that may be mistaken, and that cause them 
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to act in certain predictable ways. These children are then able to capitalize upon this 
information in order to employ tactics designed to convey to others as true what they 
know to be false (Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991). What these studies provide is very 
real and concrete support for the fact that even before the age of four, children are 
beginning to develop very early theories of mind. It also suggests that theory of mind 
can be considered as following a certain developmental trajectory that one can 
measure through the use of various tasks.  
 This suggestion that theory of mind follows a specific, largely predictable 
developmental pattern, was confirmed by Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001), who 
conducted a meta-analysis of the data involving theory-of-mind development in an 
effort to clear up some of the theoretical controversy and contradictory findings 
regarding preschoolers and false belief. The researchers stressed the considerable 
need for a grouping of the data across studies; an overwhelming number of studies 
produced a combination of above-, at-, and below-level responding on false-belief 
tasks, and something needed to be done to clear up the controversy over the nature of 
children’s performance (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
The basic finding produced by the meta-analysis, which spanned 591 false-
belief conditions, was the confirmation of a developmental effect on false-belief 
performance. Therefore, as a child’s age increases, his/her performance also 
significantly increases. This can be interpreted as providing support for the theory 
that there is significant development of false belief understanding that occurs during 
the preschool years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Another finding with 
important implications was that there was no significant effect of false belief task 
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variations. This then means that children’s performance across studies was not 
significantly influenced by variables such as the type of task, question, protagonist, 
and/or target object used by the experimenters. This is a critical finding in terms of 
theory, because it conveys the fact that children’s false belief judgments are not likely 
to be the result of responses that are task-specific, but rather the result of their strong, 
innate comprehensions of the belief states of humans, as well as the potential actions 
that result from these states (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). What Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson (2001) found, then, can be summarized comprehensively by saying 
that while children’s performance may vary according to the types of tasks and the 
phrasing of questions used by experimenters, they will eventually, as they develop, 
begin to understand all of the tasks. By the time children reach the age of four or five, 
they have achieved a fully developed theory of mind, and therefore would be 
expected to comprehend all types of false belief tasks. However, the researchers still 
suggest that one use a series of varying false belief tasks in order to obtain the most 
valid measure of a child’s theory of mind.  
Wellman and Liu (2004) performed a study to test all previous false-belief 
tasks that had been utilized by researchers in theory of mind studies, with the goal of 
creating a standardized battery of false-belief tasks to test theory of mind in 
preschoolers. Because it can be assumed that children who are developing normally 
acquire certain insights about the mind in a largely predictable order, the researchers 
hypothesized that these insights reflect and catalog an underlying developmental 
sequence that one could identify and measure in a theory of mind scale (Wellman & 
Liu, 2004). In order to select tasks for their theory of mind scale, the researchers 
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performed a meta-analysis to summarize previous research comparing types of theory 
of mind reasoning with one another. In this meta-analysis, as opposed to that of 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson (2001) the researchers wanted to analyze mental states 
rather than types of task, therefore determining which mental-state concepts were 
easier to grasp for children of preschool ages. One can imagine a variety of feasible 
outcomes resulting from the researchers’ meta-analysis. One is that they would find 
all mental states to be equally difficult for children to comprehend; they are, after all, 
internal states that may often contrast with observed external appearances and 
behavior. Another equally feasible possibility is that the researchers would find that 
children more easily grasp certain states before others, and that which states are 
understood earlier and which later would vary from child to child. Factors affecting 
this variance could range from unique individual experiences to types and amount of 
dialogue conducted within the family involving topics such as wants, beliefs, and/or 
emotions. However, what the researchers actually found contrasts with both of the 
previously described possible outcomes: the data from the meta-analysis showed that 
there is a clear and regular pattern to the development of children’s theory of mind 
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
 In the second part of their study, Wellman, Cross, & Watson (2001) 
developed a scale of theory of mind consisting of seven tasks designed to reflect the 
distinct pattern they found in their data showing that, according to their age, children 
would be expected to pass certain tasks before others. Their scale therefore consisted 
of tasks that varied in their level of cognitive complexity, so that children would be 
expected to pass the earlier tasks more easily, and to have more trouble with the later 
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tasks. Taken all together, the previous studies outlined indicate that as early as the age 
of two-and-a-half or three years old, children are beginning to comprehend deception 
and theory of mind. This knowledge continues to grow and increase until it is nearly 
fully developed at the age of four or five years, no matter the type of questions or 
tasks being used by the experimenter to test theory of mind.  
Because so much of the development of mental state understanding and theory 
of mind takes place between the years of two-and-a-half and five, it makes great 
sense to suggest that the preschool environment is the stage on which much of this 
development takes place. Much research has been conducted exploring the link 
between theory-of-mind abilities and various types of behavior patterns displayed by 
children within the preschool classroom setting. The understanding of mental states 
and their resultant actions is such a unique and crucial ability, that it would be fair to 
argue that it is connected to practically every behavior that a child can be observed 
engaging in while spending time in the classroom. The connection between theory of 
mind and preschoolers’ pro-social behavior is of particular interest in the current 
study, and so it is to this topic that the most attention is dedicated. There is a large 
body of previous research describing the relationships between preschoolers’ theory 
of mind, temperament, and factors related to prosocial behavior such as empathy, 
social competence, and peer acceptance.  
 Prosocial behavior is defined as one’s engagement in voluntary actions that 
are intended to help or benefit another individual. It has been observed that human 
neonates will display rudimentary responses to the distress of other infants as early as 
two days old (Simner, 1971). Simner (1971) described this rudimentary response as 
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the “contagion of crying,” wherein an infant will respond to another infant’s cries by 
crying him/herself. Zahn-Waxler, Friedman, and Cummings (1983) observed infants’ 
responses to children crying for their bottles, and found that common responses to the 
infants’ distress included verbal, gestural, and physical help. This was true for 
children in each age/grade, ranging from four-year-olds to sixth graders. Rates of 
physical interventions and help were also observed to increase with age.   
  It is frequently suggested that young children’s prosocial behavior may be 
prompted by empathy (Ginsburg, Ogletree, Silakowski, Bartels, Burk, & Turner, 
2003). Ginsburg et. al. (2003) therefore conducted a study exploring preschoolers’ 
abilities to understand and distinguish between empathic and selfish motives in the 
context of helping behavior. The researchers hypothesized that those children who 
display a distinct ability to differentiate between empathic and selfish motives will 
have more developed theories of mind about the empathic and selfish intentions of 
others (Ginsburg et. al., 2003).  
In their study, Ginsburg et. al. (2003) presented forty-one 36-66 month-old 
children with stories acted out by three pipe cleaner figurines. A yellow pipe cleaner 
figurine represented a person showing distress at the sound of an alarm, while the two 
other red and green pipe cleaner figurines went over to the timer that activates the 
alarm and pressed a button to terminate the sound. Either the red or the green figurine 
was presented with an empathic reason for terminating the alarm (“Because I do care 
about the friend – and the noise was hurting my friend’s ears”) while the other 
figurine was presented with a selfish reason for terminating it (“Because I do not care 
about the friend – and the noise was hurting my own ears.”) The researchers had six 
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interview items that served as the predictor variables and were designed to measure 
the participants’ theories of mind regarding the selfish or empathic motives of the two 
pipe cleaner figurines that act to turn off the alarm sound. These six items described 
the figurines’ empathic or selfish motives in three other situations in which a friend 
falls down, a friend loses a snack, and a friend finds a snack.  It was expected that 
these items would reflect each child’s ability to predict reliably the motives and acts 
of others (Ginsburg et. al. 2003). 
The researchers found that almost 60% of the children interviewed were able 
to restate the reasons given by the figures for their actions, and to distinguish between 
empathic and selfish motives correctly. They posited that this fairly low percentage 
could be attributed to the language aspect of their inclusion criteria - it may have been 
difficult for the younger children to follow and remember all of the verbal aspects of 
the story-telling, and to verbally explain their reactions to what they saw in the 
stories. Previous research has supported the possibility that young children feel 
empathy themselves and comprehend empathic intentions in others, yet lack a 
linguinsitc ability advanced enough to convey this understanding verbally (Zahn-
Waxler, 1991). However, the researchers did find that those children who were able 
to predict the motives of the pipe cleaner figurines consistently were also more 
empathic; they were more likely to give an empathic reason for terminating a loud 
alarm sound, saying that they wanted to stop it because it hurt their friend’s ears. 
Performance on theory of mind tasks additionally predicted a proclivity for sharing a 
snack with the figurine that gave empathic reasons for its actions (Ginsburg, 1991). It 
seems that theory of mind and the ability to understand the difference between selfish 
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and empathic motives of action are connected, and those children who more easily 
comprehend and differentiate between the two types of motives would be expected to 
engage in more empathic and prosocial behavior and less aggressive behavior within 
the preschool setting, therefore becoming more accepted by peers.  
There have been many studies conducted exploring the relation between 
theory of mind and peer acceptance in preschoolers. Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard 
(2002) explored this idea in their work, and described previous research indicating 
that disparities in theory of mind abilities in young children are at least somewhat 
connected to their unique social experiences. They hypothesized that theory of mind 
is, in turn, related to children’s levels of peer acceptance, or the extent to which they 
are accepted or rejected by their peers. It can be argued that a child with a more 
advanced theory of mind will be more popular within his/her peer group due to 
his/her superior ability to interpret the mental states (desires, beliefs, thoughts, and/or 
feelings) of other children. Studies have also shown that theory of mind is related to 
perspective-taking and empathy in children (Flavell & Miller, 1998; Zahn-Waxler, 
1991). This high level of interpersonal understanding would lead to the child being 
better-liked within his/her larger peer group.  
Badenes, Estevan, and Bacete (2000) also investigated the link between theory 
of mind and preschoolers’ peer acceptance, measuring four- to six-year-olds’ theory 
of mind abilities with various tasks. The researchers also measured the children’s peer 
acceptance using a peer nomination method. When they compared the popular, 
average, and rejected boys and girls, they found few differences between them on the 
theory of mind measures. The children’s performance on theory of mind tasks did not 
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vary with peer acceptance, except for the popular girls, who performed significantly 
better than did the average or neglected girls on a deception task (Badenes, Estevan, 
& Bacete, 2000). They also found that the boys who were classified as rejected had 
significantly worse performance on one theory of mind task, the white lie task. In 
tasks involving explanations of others’ behavior, these boys also made significantly 
more antagonistic attributions. Another finding that is worthy of note is that these 
results were true of the older age group of rejected boys (age six), but not for the 
younger group. This finding supports the idea that it is the cumulative effect of peer 
rejection or peer acceptance throughout development that so impacts children’s social 
growth (Badenes, Estevan, & Bacete, 2000). The body of research that has 
accumulated on the topic of theory of mind and how it relates to peer acceptance has 
failed to produce any apparent agreement, but the published studies’ results do tend to 
indicate the trend that those children who are most popular with peers and possess the 
most social skills are those who have more highly developed theories of mind. 
Slaughter, Dennis, and Pritchard (2002) found a modest positive correlation 
between theory of mind and peer acceptance, but they also found that differences in 
social-cognitive skills and capabilities have a stronger influence on peer acceptance 
as children progress in age. The researchers also found that measures of prosocial 
behavior proved to be the most significant indicator of peer acceptance in their 
sample of preschool children, which is in line with previous research indicating that 
degrees of prosocial behavior are one of the most reliable means of differentiating 
between popular and rejected children (Bukowski & Newcomb, 1984). It is therefore 
important to study the link between theory of mind and prosocial behavior. Slaughter 
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et. al. (2002) did investigate this link in their studies, but they found that after the 
influences of age and verbal ability were removed, the correlation between theory of 
mind ability and prosocial behavior was not significant. However, the researchers 
state that because of the theoretical and empirical nature of the connections between 
theory of mind and prosocial behavior (Dekovic & Gerris, 1994), it is necessary to 
examine the relationship between the two further (Slaughter et. al., 2002).  
It has been shown that even in late infancy and in the preschool years, 
children display the ability to accept some personal sacrifice in order to respond to 
others’ wants and needs (Moore, Barresi, & Thompson, 1998). For example, toddlers 
are willing to share their toys with others even when toys are scarce (Hay, Caplan, 
Castle, & Stimson, 1991), and during the second year of life, children begin to display 
other-oriented behavior when they encounter another person in distress. Prior to this 
time the child would have sought comfort for him/herself, but he/she then begins to 
switch to comforting the other, perhaps sharing a special toy or hugging the other in 
distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). A main focus of 
the research has centered on how individual differences in prosocial behavior are 
affected by variables such as personality and the social environment. For example, 
responding to the distress of others has been linked to maternal warmth (Robinson, 
Zahn-Waxler, & Emde, 1994), as well as to a child’s temperament, which was a focus 
of the present study, and will be discussed later in detail.  
Much attention has also been centered on the psychological processes that are 
involved in prosocial behavior. It has been well established that prosocial behavior 
has emotional foundations, but it also necessitates specific cognitive capabilities. An 
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example of this involves the change that takes place in the second year of life, 
described above, a shift from self-focused comforting behavior to other-focused 
comforting behavior. It has been suggested that this change is dependent on the 
child’s faculty for secondary representation, an aspect of theory of mind (Perner, 
1991, cited in Moore, Barresi, & Thompson, 1998). This would imply that the child 
understands that the distress he/she feels is empathic, and is a reaction to emotions 
originating with the other person. It has also been posited that in later preschool years, 
additional changes in prosocial behavior occur as a result of the child’s developing 
ability to engage in reasoning that is oriented toward the future, as well as to delay 
gratification (Thompson, Baressi, & Moore, 1997). More recent research has been 
conducted on the development of future-oriented prosocial behavior and its 
relationship to both the development of theory of mind and executive functioning. 
The latter two abilities have been established as displaying developmental changes 
around the age of three or four years, and it has been suggested that they are 
developmentally connected.  
Because of the parallel results regarding age differences found by researchers 
studying theory of mind, executive functioning, and prosocial behavior, as well as the 
supposed theoretical connections between them, Moore, Barresi, and Thompson 
(1998) set out to explore the relationship between performances on tasks measuring 
each concept. The researchers studied children aged three years to four-years-and-six-
months, presenting them with a sequence of trials in which they were given the 
choice between an immediate and a delayed reward of stickers. This reward either 
went solely to self, solely to a play partner, or it was shared, with both self and play 
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partner receiving stickers. Additionally, in Experiment 1, the children were asked to 
participate in standard theory of mind tasks designed to measure belief and desire 
comprehension. In Experiment 2, they also took part in an executive functioning task 
in which they had to refrain from pointing to a baited box so that they could win the 
cookie inside of it. The results of Experiment 1 supported the belief that theory of 
mind and future-oriented prosocial behavior are connected: the four-year-old children 
who showed more advanced comprehension of others’ beliefs and desires were most 
likely to delay gratification so as to share stickers with a partner, or to let the partner 
alone receive a sticker. In Experiment 2, results showed that those children in the 
youngest group (those younger than three years and five months) who displayed poor 
performance on the baited box task were also likely to pick the immediate reward for 
self option in the sticker reward choices. This indicates that the failure of the children 
to delay can be attributed to a lack of ability to detach from the immediate reward; it 
is difficult for them to remove themselves from the stimulus and inhibit action so as 
to perform a more goal-oriented behavior instead. However, this correlation did not 
hold for the older children, indicating that executive functioning may play a larger 
part earlier on in the development of future-oriented behavior (Moore, Barresi, & 
Thompson, 1998).  
These results seem to suggest that those children with more developed 
theories of mind are more likely to engage in future-oriented sharing behaviors; the 
children who were able to pick the delay option in both the sticker reward and baited 
box tasks must think about the mental states of themselves and of others, while 
simultaneously restraining their desires for the immediate reward. However, because 
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the study was correlational in nature, it is difficult to determine what is affecting 
what. It is possible that the changes that take place in theory of mind and executive 
functioning are somehow dependent on the development of the capacity to partake in 
future-oriented behavior, but it’s also equally possible that the development of future-
oriented prosocial behavior depends on one cognitive capacity, and once in place it 
promotes the development of other cognitive transformations (Moore, Barresi, & 
Thompson, 1998). However, it is important to reiterate the age differences observed 
in this study: the researchers observed the significant associations between executive 
functioning and future-oriented prosocial behavior in the younger three-year-olds, 
while the significant associations between theory of mind and future-oriented 
prosocial behavior were observed in the younger four-year-olds. This age difference 
is consistent with previous research positing that early in development, executive 
functioning plays a central role in future-oriented prosocial behavior, but later on in 
development, a growing theory of mind is more important. While it is difficult to 
pinpoint the exact nature of the correlational relationship in this study, it is clear that 
there are definite relationships between a child’s ability to act in ways so as to benefit 
another’s future interests, his/her ability to inhibit certain strong and immediate 
responses to perceptual stimuli, and the development of his/her theory of mind 
(Moore, Barresi, & Thompson, 1998). Especially for pre-schoolers, who are relatively 
far along in this process of growth and development of executive functioning and 
theory of mind, one would expect to see a connection between the children’s theory-
of-mind abilities and their tendencies to inhibit immediate gratification for 
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themselves, to take others’ desires into account, and to engage in prosocial behaviors 
such as sharing. 
Hay, Payne, and Chadwick (2004) conducted a thorough review of children’s 
social development from the toddler years to mid-elementary school years, 
consolidating and interpreting the findings in order to highlight certain trends in 
development. The researchers discuss the role of social understanding during the 
preschool years in creating children who are successful in their peer relationships. 
They cite studies exploring how deficits and biases in abilities related to theory of 
mind and social-information processing play a role in peer relations, a phenomenon 
that is observed especially in the early childhood years. It is during these years, as has 
been discussed throughout this paper, that children begin to understand mental states 
of others, especially desires and beliefs, and also develop their abilities to produce 
solutions to interpersonal problems (Hay et. al.,  2004). Hay et. al. (2004) additionally 
describe the widely-supported view that theory of mind and social competence are 
related, and also cite research showing that the comprehension of white lies and 
deception is linked to the promotion of a child’s positive status within his/her peer 
group. Theory of mind abilities have also been found to be greater among those 
children with more advanced verbal abilities, who have a friendship that is mutual, 
and who are popular among peers (Peterson & Siegel, 2002).  
Problems in social understanding can arise from both deficits and biases in 
theory of mind abilities. For instance, one facet of theory of mind is the capacity to 
understand the intentions of others, and the misunderstanding or misattribution of 
another person’s intentions is related to peer problems that increase in severity as 
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time passes. The misattribution of peers’ intentions has been linked to a variety of 
negative outcomes, such as frustration and the child’s angry and aggressive acts of 
retaliation resulting from his/her perception of being provoked or aggravated 
(Schwartz et. al., 1998). Peer groups have negative evaluations of this kind of reactive 
aggression, and it is thus correlated with victimization. It is clear from these findings 
that shortcomings in cognitive skills such as theory of mind abilities have negative 
outcomes for children’s social interactions and peer relations during the preschool 
years. The relationship between executive functioning and theory of mind is also 
outlined by Hay, Payne, and Chadwick (2004), who describe studies indicating that 
“hard-to-manage” children display not only deficiencies in the ability to impute the 
mental states of others, but also impairments in inhibitory control. Research has also 
been conducted to investigate how peer status is affected by children’s abilities to 
comprehend lies and mistakes. 
Peterson and Siegel (2002) conducted a study to investigate the relationships 
between peer relations, the development of children’s abilities regarding the moral 
comprehension of differences between lies and mistakes, and their theories of mind 
based on performance on standard false belief tests. The researchers describe findings 
from previous studies that those preschoolers who are classified as rejected are slower 
than their less-rejected peers are to understand the differences between actions that 
are universally regarded as wrong, and those that are widely accepted as wrong 
because of subjective social conventions. They therefore reasoned that there might be 
a connection between children’s popularity among peers and their more advanced 
moral understanding of lies, and also between rejected children and deficiencies in 
       
  21
moral understanding. The researchers hypothesized that those children with the most 
developed theory of mind, especially those with a more developed awareness of false 
belief on standard tasks, would be the most cognitively well-equipped to understand 
the consequences of a liar’s deliberate attempt to promote false belief within his/her 
listeners. These children should also more readily utilize their cognitive and moral 
understanding to pardon unintentional lies verbalized by others in realizing that they 
can be based on the other’s beliefs that do not coincide with reality (Peterson & 
Siegel, 2002). Furthermore, it was suggested that those children with stable mutual 
friendships would have more developed abilities to comprehend false belief. This 
relationship, it is important to note, can go in either direction; children who have a 
stable mutual friendship have more opportunities to interact closely with a peer and 
learn social skills that contribute to theory of mind development, or conversely, a 
child with a more advanced theory of mind may be a more desirable candidate for a 
mutual friendship because of his/her awareness of false belief and interpersonal 
awareness.  
Each child in the Peterson and Siegel (2002) study was tested individually on 
measures of theory of mind (false belief), language ability, moral understanding 
(understanding lies and mistakes, and the difference between them), and peer 
acceptance. Their results indicated clear and definite relations between peer 
acceptance, the social cognitive skill of mindreading, and moral understanding. The 
children who were classified as rejected within the entire peer group, and who were 
reported as having no stable mutual friendships, were also the children who scored 
the most poorly on theory of mind tasks. They were also behind their popular 
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classmates who had stable mutual friendships in terms of understanding the moral 
difference between deliberate lies and mistakes. Again, one must carefully consider 
the two directions this relationship can take. Perhaps these rejected children scored 
poorly on tests of these social cognitive functions because of their lack of satisfactory 
interactions with peers; their opportunities to practice pretending, deception, telling 
lies, and mindreading are much more limited because of this, and they are therefore 
put at a disadvantage for important social and cognitive growth. On the other hand, 
perhaps children who are already delayed in their mental state awareness and moral 
understanding have a weakened ability to connect with peers and create lasting stable 
friendships and/or gain peer acceptance in the classroom (Peterson & Siegel, 2002).  
The researchers also found an interesting pattern concerning the ways in 
which peer relations influence moral understanding and false belief understanding. 
Among the children who were classified as rejected by the peer group generally, 
those who still had a stable mutual friendship performed just as well as popular 
children with lasting mutual friendships in distinguishing between lies and mistakes. 
This would suggest that stable mutual friendships had a compensating effect for the 
rejected children who did not have the same social interaction advantages as their 
popular peers. However, in terms of theory of mind and false belief performance, 
popular children with stable mutual friendships performed better than did popular 
children without any such stable mutual friendships, and rejected children without 
any stable friendships predictably performed the worst out of all the groups. Results 
of regression analyses additionally showed that mutual friendships “made a 
statistically significant independent contribution to advanced development” (Peterson 
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& Siegel, 2002; 221) for false belief but not for moral understanding, even after 
controlling for preferences and rejection by the wider peer group. Perhaps a deeper 
kind of insight into the minds of others is needed in order to impute their false beliefs 
than to understand their deceptive intentions.  
The last important finding to note about the study by Peterson and Siegel 
(2002) is that while there was a correlation established between the preschoolers’ 
scores on theory of mind and moral understanding tasks, the researchers failed to find 
that one or the other of these social cognitive functions must be in place before the 
other can develop. An advanced understanding of false belief did not have any 
independent effect on a moral understanding of the distinction between lies and 
mistakes when variables such as verbal ability, age, and peer popularity were 
controlled for, and the same was found for the effect of moral awareness on theory of 
mind development (Peterson & Siegel, 2002). What this means is that preschoolers’ 
rates of development of the social cognitive functions necessary for the understanding 
and use of false belief, lying, and deception are affected by a number of factors, 
including age, social environment, status among peer groups, stable friendships, and 
verbal ability. It has also been suggested that temperament plays a role in theory of 
mind development, and also in how individual children use their theory of mind skills 
to behave in certain ways, for example, prosocially or antisocially (Ronald, Happé, 
Hughes, & Plomin, 2005).  
The current study sought to explore the nature of the relationship between 
preschoolers’ theory of mind abilities and prosocial behavior. Research into how 
children’s individual temperaments affect their prosocial behavior and theory of mind 
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development, however, is scarce. However, certain studies have produced findings 
that help to formulate hypotheses about how temperament may play a role in these 
types of social cognitive functions. Ronald, Happé, Hughes, and Plomin (2002) found 
that as two- and three-year-old children begin to develop theories of mind, they use 
the accompanying skills and knowledge in either “nice”, prosocial ways (e.g. 
attempting to intervene in fights and resolve conflicts), or “nasty” ways (e.g. placing 
the blame on others for certain things), depending on their temperament, as well as 
other factors such as social aims (Ronald et. al., 2002; 680). The researchers also 
suggested that one possible hypothesis regarding how the development of theory of 
mind relates to preschoolers’ engagement in prosocial and antisocial behavior is 
interactionist in nature. This indicates that theory-of-mind ability interacts with 
children’s individual differences in temperament in order to generate behaviors that 
vary among children. However, because no studies have looked simultaneously at the 
effects of temperament and theory of mind ability on the development of prosocial 
behavior, it will be necessary to explore the literature on each factor individually. 
It is generally accepted that temperament is an important factor to consider 
when investigating children’s social behavior. Much research has been conducted in 
order to explore the factors that are most salient in determining the development of 
children’s social behavior during the preschool years, and temperament is frequently 
cited as one of these important factors. A study by Diener and Kim (2004) 
investigated the role of child temperament and maternal characteristics on 
preschoolers’ social competence in the classroom, citing the fact that prosocial 
behavior has been shown to predict greater social competence in the childhood years, 
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as well as in adulthood (Eisenberg et. al., 1999). Diener and Kim (2004) focused on 
three aspects of children’s social competence in their study, including prosocial 
behavior, social withdrawal, and externalizing behaviors. Behavior that is classified 
as socially competent implies engagement in effective social interactions, including 
the ability to get along well with others, prompting or joining play with others, and 
resolving disagreements with peers (Rose-Krasnor, 1997), and prosocial behavior, 
such as helping others, is a sign of social competence because it promotes more 
successful peer relations. Other studies have found support for the connection 
between sociability  
Stanhope, Bell, and Parker-Cohen (1987) investigated how the interaction of 
children’s temperaments with situational factors affected 24 preschoolers’ 
engagement in helping behaviors. The children were given four different 
opportunities to help a female researcher, all of which took place in the laboratory 
during a play session. Mothers completed questionnaires designed to assess their 
children’s helpfulness in the home setting. The researchers also collected multiple 
measures of sociability from mothers and preschool teachers, as well as a more broad 
dimension of temperament they termed “social adaptability”. This dimension 
combined the Approach/Withdrawal, Adaptability, and Mood scales of the 
Behavioral Style Questionnaire (Carey, Fox, & McDevitt, 1977), and the researchers 
hypothesized that children who more easily adapt to new situations and have more 
positive moods would be more likely to engage in helping behaviors than children 
who are lower on these dimensions. They also posited that those children who score 
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higher on Buss & Plomin’s (1984) temperament dimension of sociability would tend 
to be more helpful.  
The researchers found that the children’s sociability was significantly 
positively related to their helping behavior in the laboratory environment, but not in 
the home. They explained this phenomenon by reasoning that in the unfamiliar setting 
of the laboratory, the person who needed help was a stranger, a factor that could have 
affected the sociable and unsociable children in differing ways. They also found that 
children’s social adaptability was significantly positively related to their mothers’ 
ratings of their helpfulness at home, but not to their helpfulness scores in the 
laboratory, most likely because this measure relied on mothers’ memories of their 
children’s reactions to various situations with familiar people (Stanhope, Bell, Parker-
Cohen, 1987). The results of this study provided support for the idea that 
temperament is related to children’s helping behavior, specifically the dimension of 
sociability, which affects children’s helping behavior when interacting with a stranger 
in the laboratory setting (Stanhope, Bell, & Parker-Cohen, 1987). Other studies have 
found support for the connection between a children’s sociability and their 
proclivities for behaving prosocially in certain situations, citing positive correlations 
between preschoolers’ helping behavior in the classroom and the number of social 
interactions in which they were involved (Eisenberg, Pasternack, Cameron, & Tryon, 
1984; Eisenberg-berg & Hand, 1979). 
Diener and Kim (2004) decided to look at the combination of temperament, 
specifically the dimension of emotionality, and self-regulation, to see how the two 
acting together affect children’s prosocial behavior and social competence. They 
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suggested that for those children who are temperamentally more likely to experience 
high levels of negative affect, self-regulation is especially critical in order to smooth 
social interactions with peers. They also cited the hypothesis put forth in previous 
research by Eisenberg and Fabes (1992) positing that children who have high 
negative emotionality but who also are high on self-regulation will engage in more 
prosocial behavior than those children who have high negative emotionality but are 
also poor self-regulators (Eisenberg & Gabes, 1992, cited in Diener & Kim, 2004). A 
study by DiLalla (1998) also looked at the effect of preschoolers’ self-regulation 
abilities and emotionality on their social competence. In her study, DiLalla observed 
the connection between children’s temperaments as rated by their parents, and their 
social behavior, and her findings indicated that children whose parents described 
them as having an easy temperament displayed more prosocial behavior in an 
interaction with an unfamiliar peer. A study by Farver and Branstetter (2004) 
observed children’s responses to their peers’ distress in the form of crying, and found 
that again, those children who were rated as having an easy temperament by parents 
were most likely to react to their peers’ distress with prosocial behaviors, while those 
children who were rated as difficult were least likely to do so.  
In Diener and Kim’s (2004) study, the researchers asked 110 mothers to 
complete questionnaires about their children’s temperament and self-regulation, as 
well as self-reports of their maternal separation anxiety. The researchers also coded 
mothers’ interactional styles with their children from videotapes, and each child’s 
teacher completed questionnaires on the child’s social competence. Their findings 
showed that the preschoolers’ social competence was predicted by all three factors of 
       
  28
maternal characteristics, child temperament, and child self-regulation, as well as by 
the presence of a familiar classmate. The risk factors that predicted less prosocial 
behavior included the expression of higher levels of anger, as well as inhibition 
(similar to shyness); high levels of activity; poor self-regulation; mothers who 
expressed more anxiety upon separation from their child; and the absence of a 
familiar classmate (Diener & Kim, 2004). These findings align with previous studies 
showing that older children’s emotionality and self-regulation abilities predict social 
competence, as well as studies showing that preschoolers’ emotional and 
temperamental traits, along with their self-regulation abilities, are important 
predictors of their behavior among peers (Eisenberg et. al., 1993).  
Blair, Denham, Kochanoff, and Whipple (2004) similarly studied the 
relationship between temperament, emotion regulation, and social competence in 
preschoolers, citing the following statement by the National Research Council and 
Institute of Medicine: “research is revealing the large extent to which the task of 
learning how to manage one’s emotions…is a different challenge for children with 
different temperaments…” (National Reseach Council and Institute of Medicine, 
2000, p. 114, cited in Blair et. al., 2004). Emotion regulation has been defined in 
many ways, but can be summed up as the interaction of various complex cognitive 
and behavioral processes working together to regulate affective experiences (Blair et. 
al., 2004). Studies have shown that emotion regulation plays a critical role in many 
aspects of the development of successful social behavior; it is crucial for preschoolers 
to develop knowledge of socially acceptable behavior, and additionally contributes to 
their status among peers, their adjustment and their sympathy (Eisenberg, Fabes, 
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Guthrie, & Reiser, 2002). All of these, in turn, have been shown to be important 
factors that are related to the development and preservation of children’s social 
relationships.  
Blair et. al. (2004) cite the connection between temperament and various 
definitions of emotion regulation, as well as temperament’s clearly established effects 
on childhood behavior, and posit that children’s tendencies toward various types of 
temperament might, in combination with their coping and/or regulation abilities in the 
face of negative affective experiences, predict these children’s social outcomes. A 
more complete understanding of this relationship between temperament and emotion 
regulation abilities would be beneficial, as it would help to explain what causes 
particular children to be aggressive or prosocial, as well as adjusted and maladjusted.  
While the relationship between temperament dimensions and socially 
competent behavior development has received relatively little attention compared to 
that focused on temperament’s connections to maladaptive behavior, it has been 
established that temperament dimensions directly forecast future prosocial behavior. 
Many literature reviews of this type of research indicate a linear relationship between 
temperament and social competence (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). An example of this 
relationship would be findings indicating that preschoolers who have “easy” 
temperaments, or who are quickly soothed and are persistent, tend to engage in more 
socially competent behaviors (Kochanska, 1997) than do their peers who are 
identified as being less “easy.” However, studies that have looked at both socially 
competent and incompetent behaviors, have consistently found a stronger direct 
connection between temperament dimensions and negative outcomes than that 
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between temperament and prosocial behaviors (Nelson, Martin, Hodge, Havill, & 
Kamphaus, 1999). 
Blair et. al. (2004) cite the fact that research has also shown that temperament 
may interact with the development of social competence in a more differentiated way. 
For example, studies have produced findings indicating that other factors, such as 
verbal ability or intelligence may interact with temperament dimensions in order to 
predict behavior that is socially competent (Rothbart & Bates, 1998).  Additionally, it 
is believed that temperament primes children for certain development courses that 
largely determine adjustment (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). This proposition can be 
reframed as a “vulnerability or predisposition” (Blair et. al., 2004, pp. 423) model, 
describing the way in which differences in temperament might be altered during the 
course of developmental processes, transforming into other types of adjustment that 
are more complex (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). Therefore, certain temperament 
dimensions may prompt an individual towards specific outcomes, but other 
developmental processes might play a considerable role in forecasting adjustment as 
well. While it is clear that more research is needed in order to tease out the exact 
nature of the connections between temperament dimensions, self-regulation, and 
social behaviors, it is clear that temperament plays a significant role in the 
development of social relationships. It is important to take temperamental dimensions 
into account when investigating preschoolers’ social behavior in order to identify 
which types of dimensions might promote or inhibit the healthy development of 
social competence, and specifically prosocial behavior. 
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The current study, through the use of the series of seven theory of mind tasks 
analyzed and validated by Wellman and Liu (2004), sought to explore the relationship 
among children’s temperaments and theory of mind abilities on their levels of 
prosocial behavior. Children between the preschool ages of four and five participated 
in the seven false-belief tasks to measure the development of their theory of mind 
comprehension. Additionally, the children’s parents/guardians were asked to 
complete a temperament questionnaire for their child, as well as a demographic 
questionnaire. The preschool children’s teachers were also asked to fill out a brief 
prosocial behavior questionnaire about each child. It was hypothesized that prosocial 
behavior would positively correlate with performance on false belief tasks. Children 
who are more developed in their theory of mind abilities also possess greater 
interpersonal awareness and mental state understanding, and so will be more likely to 
engage in prosocial behaviors such as helping and sharing. A secondary hypothesis 
was that the sociability dimension of temperament as described by Buss (1991) would 
correlate positively with children’s theory of mind performance as reflected by their 
scores on the false belief tasks. Children who are more social seek out more social 
interactions, are more at ease with peer relations, and are more responsive to those 
around them, thus being more likely to engage in play with their peers (Farver & 
Branstetter, 1994). Interactions with peers have a large effect on children’s 
development of social skills, and therefore sociable children are most likely to 
cultivate the skills and awareness needed for an understanding of mental states, a 
large aspect of theory of mind. Children who are more social and who have better 
performance on false belief tasks are also predicted to engage in more prosocial 
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behavior. Also, children who rate higher on the problem behavior of shyness as 
described by Buss (1991), which was also measured by the temperament 
questionnaire, would be expected, due to their reluctance to interact with peers, to 
have poorer performance on theory of mind tasks, and also to engage in less prosocial 
behavior (Farver & Branstetter, 1994). The effect of the emotionality dimension as 
described by Buss (1991) on theory of mind is not easily predicted, but perhaps 
children who are more emotionally reactive and more prone to anger and fear would 
have less successful and more volatile interactions with peers, causing a possible 
slight negative correlation with theory of mind, and therefore also with prosocial 
behavior. The dimension of activity level (Buss, 1991) is also not expected to have a 
significant relationship to theory of mind, because there is no theoretical indication 
that children’s activity levels have any significant relationship to their understanding 
of mental states.  
In sum, the main hypothesis of the current study was that those children who 
have better developed theories of mind as reflected by performance on false-belief 
tasks would also score higher on a measure of prosocial behavior, while those 
children who have less developed theories of mind would score lower on prosocial 
behavior.  Additionally, it was predicted that theory of mind scores and prosocial 
behavior scores would correlate positively with the temperament dimension of 
sociability, and would correlate negatively with the temperament dimensions of 
shyness, and, to a lesser extent, emotionality.  
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Method 
Participants 
 The participants of the current study included 42 preschool and kindergarten 
children (21 males and 21 females), ranging in age from 39 to 72 months (M = 53.56 
months, SD = 7.43 months). The current sample of children included 11 three-year-
olds, 23 four-year-olds, seven five-year-olds, and one six-year-old. All the children 
were students, with nine enrolled in one local school, and the remaining 33 enrolled 
in a different local school. Most children were either first-born (N = 15) or second-
born (N = 17), but some were only children (N = 7), and very few were third-born (N 
= 3). All children but one lived with both parents (N = 41). The one child who did not 
live with both parents was an adoptee living with her adoptive mother. Lastly, 
parents’ education levels were measured, and it was found that all parents had at least 
obtained a four-year college degree (N = 83), but most had also received a higher 
degree, such as a master’s degree (N = 34), and an MD/JD/PhD/Post Doctoral (N = 
33). 
Materials 
 To obtain parents’ permission for their children to participate, the parents 
were sent a packet of information that contained a cover letter explaining the study 
(see Appendix A), a consent form (see Appendix B), a demographic questionnaire 
(see Appendix C), and Buss and Plomin’s EAS Temperament Questionnaire (1984). 
The demographic questionnaire included questions about the child’s age, ethnic 
background, birth order, and each parent’s highest level of education. The 
Temperament Questionnaire by Buss and Plomin (1984) is comprised of 20 questions 
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designed to measure children on four subscales of temperament, which are 
Emotionality (e.g., “Child often fusses and cries”), Activity (e.g., “Child is very 
energetic”), Sociability (e.g., “Child makes friends easily”), and Shyness (e.g., “Child 
takes a long time to warm up to strangers”). Each subscale was measured by five of 
the 20 questions, and all questions were scored on a Likert scale, with 5 being “very 
characteristic of my child”, and 1 as “not characteristic of my child.” High scores on 
the subscales of emotionality, activity, sociability, and shyness indicate children who 
display higher levels of each of those dimensions. To ensure confidentiality, each 
child was assigned an identification number to be certain that his or her name was not 
needed during data collection and analysis.  
 Each child’s understanding of theory of mind was measured using the battery 
of standard false belief tasks taken from a study done by Wellman and Lui (2004). 
The battery included seven false-belief tasks, designed to be conducted in a certain 
order as described by the researchers. Each of the tasks required different props in 
order to facilitate the description of the storyline to the children. The props were as 
follows: three figurines of boys; one figurine of a girl; a small plastic toy pig; a small 
plastic toy dog; an empty band-aids box; an empty Cheerios single-serving size box; a 
non-descript white box; and rocks. Three drawings were also used as props in the 
storylines of three of the tasks: one drawing of a cookie and a carrot; one of a set of 
bushes and a garage; and one of a happy face, a neutral face, and a sad face. The 
children’s responses to each task were recorded on Task Data Sheets (Appendix D). 
 Each child’s prosocial behavior was measured using a questionnaire adapted 
from Weir, Stevenson, and Graham’s (1980) Prosocial Behavior Questionnaire for 
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Teachers. Weir et. al.’s original questionnaire is 20 items long, so in order to shorten 
the length, ten items were selected which were found by Tremblay, Vitaro, and 
Gagnon (1992) to load most highly on the prosocial component of their factor 
analysis. The current questionnaire was therefore comprised of these ten questions, 
completed by each participant’s classroom teacher, scored on a Likert-type scale, 
with 1 being “Rarely applies”, and 3 being “Certainly applies.” Sample items 
include, “Will invite bystanders to join in a game”, and “Comforts a child who is 
crying or upset.” Possible scores ranged from 10 to 30, and a higher score indicated a 
more prosocial child. The internal reliability of the scale was calculated, and 
Cronbach’s alpha for the ten items was found to be 0.84. 
Procedure 
 Packets of information were put into each child’s mailbox at their school, so 
that parents could pick them up. Each packet contained a cover letter, a consent form, 
a demographic questionnaire, and the Buss and Plomin Temperament Questionnaire 
(1984). When parents returned the packet with the consent form completed, and 
permission for their child to participate had been obtained, a time was set up with 
each preschool for the researcher to complete the theory of mind tasks with the 
children.  
 For testing of the theory of mind tasks, the researcher entered the classroom 
and asked each child individually whether or not he/she would like to play a few 
games with her. All children but two agreed to play. The two who were not willing 
were informed that it was okay that they did not want to play, and were removed from 
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the sample. Once each child agreed to play, he/she sat at a table with the researcher in 
a quiet corner separated from the rest of the classroom by a divider. 
 The researcher worked individually with each child, reading the series of 
seven false-belief stories (Wellman & Liu, 2004) in one of six different random 
orders. Verbatim instructions of each task can be found in Appendix E. According to 
Wellman and Liu (2004), the seven false-belief tasks are progressively more difficult, 
and therefore must be presented in such an order that the Diverse Desires and the 
Diverse Beliefs tasks were always presented either first or second, and the Real-
Apparent Emotion task was always last. The remaining four, which were the 
Knowledge Access, Contents False Belief, Explicit False Belief, and Belief Emotion 
tasks, were assigned a random order in between the three others. Scores were 
obtained by giving one point to each task if the child answered answered both of the 
task’s target questions correctly. Once all questions were answered, the researcher 
thanked the child, let him/her pick out a sticker as a thank-you reward, and then sent 
him/her back out into the classroom.  
 On the same day that the researcher went into the classrooms to conduct the 
theory of mind tasks with the participants, she also distributed the Prosocial Behavior 
Questionnaire for Teachers (Weir, Stevenson, & Graham, 1980) to the participants’ 
primary teacher(s), asking them to take their time in completing the questionnaires, 
and explaining how to fill them out. The researcher and the teachers agreed on a time 
for the researcher to return and collect the completed questionnaires. The interval of 
time that passed between the researcher distributing the questionnaires and re-
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collecting them from teachers ranged from one to four days depending on the 
classroom. 
Results 
 The means and standard deviations of all variables are reported in Table 1.T-
tests comparing males and females on all of the major dependent variables showed 
that there were no significant differences between boys and girls on any of the 
variables measured, including shyness t(40) = -.82, p = .42; sociability t(40) = .54, p = 
.59; emotionality t(40) = .18, p = .86; activity t(40) = .299, p = .77; prosocial t(34) = 
.92, p = .36; theory of mind t(40) = -.19, p = .85; and age in months t(40) = -.27, p = 
.79. These insignificant results revealed that boys and girls did not differ from each 
other significantly, and so were combined as one group for the remaining analyses. 
Table 1. 
Means of the Variables of Interest for Males and Females 
                                     Males                       Females 
Variables                 M         SD                   M       SD 
Shyness                  2.69      0.89                2.46     0.96 
Sociability              3.64      0.68                3.74     0.58 
Emotionality           2.77     0.77                 2.81     0.91 
Activity                   3.75     0.94                 3.82     0.64 
Prosocial                17.62    3.34                18.86    5.19 
ToM                        4.86     1.68                 4.76     1.58 
Age                         53.86    7.64                53.24   7.38 
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In order to test the hypothesis that more prosocial children perform better on 
theory of mind tasks than do less prosocial children, the correlations among the 
variables of interest, including age, theory of mind, prosocial behavior, activity, 
emotionality, sociability, shyness, and birth order were computed (Table 2). This 
hypothesis was not supported, as there was no significant relationship between theory 
of mind and prosocial behavior r = .06, p = .69. Further analyses revealed prosocial 
scores were strongly positively correlated with scores on the activity dimension of 
temperament r = .53, p < .01, such that children who were rated as more active were 
also rated as more prosocial than those children who were rated as less active. 
Prosocial scores were also negatively correlated with scores on the shyness dimension 
of temperament r = -.39, p = .01, such that children rated as more shy were also rated 
as less prosocial than those children who were rated as less shy. It was also found that 
theory of mind was correlated with age r = .32, p < .05, such that the older children 
performed significantly better on theory of mind tasks than did younger children. 
Theory of mind was negatively correlated with the emotionality dimension of 
temperament r = -.32, p < .05, such that those children who were rated as more 
emotional performed significantly worse on theory of mind tasks than those children 
who were rated as less emotional. Other relationships of interest showed no 
significant correlation, including theory of mind and sociability r = .03, p = .83.  Birth 
order was found to have a marginally significant positive correlation to sociability, r 
= .27, p = .09, and to have a marginally significant negative correlation with prosocial 
behavior, r = -.27, p = .09, meaning that later-borns were more sociable but less 
prosocial than earlier-borns.  
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Table 2. 
Pearson’s r Analysis for Variables In Relation to Theory of Mind 
Measure         1          2               3               4               5               6               7              8 
1. Theory     1      .32**          .06            .03         -.32**          .03        -.098          .07                   
of Mind 
 
2. Age                      1             .19           .18           -.03           -.08           -.15         -.23 
3.   Prosocial                              1          .53***       -.06            .01        -.39***     -.27*     
4.   Activity                                               1            .025           .36**     -.57***      -.02 
5.   Emotionality                                                         1              .09           .095          .09 
6.   Sociability                                                                               1            -.44**  .265*   
7.   Shyness                                                                                                     1       -.095 
8.   Birth Order                                                                                                             1 
Note. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. N = 42 for all correlations.  
 Because there was such a strong significant correlation between age and 
theory of mind, partial correlations were computed controlling for the age variable. 
When age was partialled out, the pattern of correlations did not change. The 
relationship between theory of mind and emotionality remained significant r = -.33, p 
< .05. Additionally, the relationships between prosocial scores and activity, and 
between prosocial scores and shyness both remained significant r = .51, p < .01, and r 
= -.38, p = .015, respectively. All other relationships remained not significantly 
correlated (Table 3). 
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Table 3. 
Partial Correlations Controlling for Age. 
Measure                1               2                  3                  4                       5                      6                            
1. Theory      1             .00              -.04             -.33*                   .06                -.05                  
of mind 
2. Prosocial                   1               .51**           -.055                   .02              -.38* 
3. Activity                                         1                 .03                    .38*          -.55** 
4. Emotionality                                                       1                      .09                .09 
5. Sociability                                                                                    1            -.46**  
6. Shyness                                                                                                            1 
Note: * p  < .05, ** p < .01. N = 42 for all correlations 
 Lastly, a linear regression was conducted to predict scores on the prosocial 
questionnaire, using the variables of theory of mind, activity, age in months, and 
shyness as predictors. As Table 4 shows, these variables were shown to account for a 
significant amount of the variance, R  = .22, F (4, 37) = 3.94, p < .01. Only the 
variable of activity was found to predict the scores on the prosocial questionnaire, ß = 
.43, such that more active children were rated as more prosocial than were less active 
children. The rest of the predictors were shown to be insignificant in predicting 
prosocial scores, and can be found in Table 4. 
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Table 4. 
Summary of Linear Regression Analysis of Variables Thought to Predict Prosocial 
Scores. 
Variable B SE B ß 
Theory of Mind .025 .395 .009 
Age in Months 0.05 0.09 0.09 
Activity 2.39 0.93 0.43* 
Shyness -0.63 0.79 -0.13 
Note. R  = .22 (p < .01). * p  = .01. 
Discussion 
 The purpose of the current study was to examine the relationships among 
theory of mind, prosocial behavior, and temperament. The first hypothesis predicted 
that development of theory of mind ability would be positively related to engagement 
in prosocial behavior, such that children with more developed theory-of-mind 
abilities, and who therefore have a more complex ability to take the perspective of 
another, would engage in more prosocial behavior. The data did not support this 
hypothesis; results showed that the relationship between theory of mind and prosocial 
behavior was not significant. Results regarding the relationships between 
temperament and both theory of mind and prosocial behavior were mixed.  
The lack of a significant relationship between theory of mind and prosocial 
behavior was unexpected, considering research supporting the idea that the 
development of theory of mind and the cognitive skills that it entails, such as 
understanding of others’ mental states and how they dictate behavior, promote factors 
thought to be related to prosocial behavior. Ginsburg et. al. (2003) demonstrated that 
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children with  more developed theories of mind are better able to distinguish between 
empathic and selfish motives of helping behavior. Furthermore, when given a chance 
to provide an empathic or selfish explanation for an action, children with more 
developed theories of mind would provide an empathic explanation. Therefore, one 
could suggest based on these findings that children with more developed theories of 
mind would engage in more empathic and prosocial behavior themselves within the 
preschool setting. Additional studies have shown that theory of mind is related to 
perspective-taking and empathy in children – factors related to prosocial behavior 
(Flavell & Miller; Zahn-Waxler, 1991), as well as to children’s abilities to delay 
gratification and engage in future-oriented prosocial behavior to benefit another child 
(Moore et. al., 1998). For these reasons, the present findings were unexpected. 
 It could be the case that the development of theory of mind is not as important 
of a factor as researchers believe it to be; it is possible that there are other factors 
influencing prosocial behavior that are more salient than that of the development of 
theory of mind. Slaughter et. al. (2002) found that theory-of-mind ability was the best 
predictor of social preference scores for older children, meaning those who were over 
the age of five years, and their overall pattern of results suggested that the influence 
of theory-of-mind ability on peer acceptance is modest but increases with age. These 
findings align with those of Badenes et. al. (2000) who found that only in the older 
boys in their sample (those who were six years old) was theory of mind found to be 
related to making more antagonistic attributions about others’ behavior, and to being 
classified as rejected from peer groups. These findings seem to suggest that 
differences in social-cognitive skills and capabilities such as theory of mind have a 
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stronger influence on peer acceptance as children develop. Since engagement in 
prosocial behavior is an important determinant of children’s social status in their peer 
groups, it may also be the case that theory-of-mind abilities do not exert a significant 
influence on prosocial behavior until the later ages of five and six years old. The 
children in the current study’s sample were mostly three- and four-year-olds, and a 
positive correlation was found between age and theory-of-mind ability, such that the 
older children in the sample had better-developed theories of mind. This finding is not 
surprising considering it has been found in many previous studies (Chandler et. al., 
1989; Hala et. al., 1991). One would therefore expect that five- and six-year-olds 
would have even better developed theories of mind than three- and four-year-olds, 
and that the effect of theory of mind on prosocial behavior would become stronger in 
this older age group. It would therefore be beneficial to conduct the current study 
with an older age group, beginning with five-year-olds and extending into 
elementary-age children. Slaughter et. al. (2002) also suggest that there are a variety 
of factors that might mediate relations between theory of mind and peer acceptance, 
such as verbal ability and intelligence, so it would be beneficial to conduct a study 
investigating how these factors relate to the impact of theory of mind on prosocial 
behavior as well.  
 A second set of hypotheses predicted that theory of mind and prosocial 
behavior would be positively correlated with the temperament dimensions of 
sociability, and would correlate negatively with the dimensions of shyness and 
emotionality. Theory of mind was found to be negatively correlated with 
emotionality, such that more emotional children scored lower on theory-of-mind 
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ability, but theory of mind was not significantly correlated with shyness or sociability. 
It could be that more emotional children, who are more prone to feelings of anger and 
fear, have more volatile interpersonal interactions with peers, and find it more 
difficult to take the perspective of others, resulting in a less developed theory of mind. 
However, it is surprising that shyness and theory of mind were not found to be 
related, considering that shy children would be expected to have less well-developed 
theories of mind due to their inhibition in peer interactions. Perhaps peer interactions 
are not as important in the development of theory of mind as the hypothesis 
suggested.  
Prosocial behavior was found to be significantly negatively correlated with 
shyness, such that more shy children tended to be less prosocial, but prosocial 
behavior was not significantly related to emotionality or to sociability. It is not 
surprising that children who are more shy tend to be less prosocial, as these more 
inhibited children are probably less likely than their more sociable peers to seek out 
interpersonal interactions, and therefore have less opportunity to initiate or engage in 
prosocial behaviors such as sharing or helping. However, it is surprising that 
prosocial behavior and sociability were not related, in light of the fact that sociability 
has been found to be related to children’s willingness to help an unfamiliar stranger 
(Stanhope, Bell, & Parker-Cohen, 1987). It could also be posited that more social 
children engage in more interpersonal interactions, therefore gaining more experience 
in navigating relationships, and learning to behave more prosocially. However, this 
was not the case in the current study.  
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Interestingly, a significant positive correlation was found between prosocial 
behavior and the temperament dimension of activity, such that more active children 
were more prosocial. This finding was unexpected, but could be due to the fact that 
active children are always up and running around, engaging with others and seeking 
interaction. They therefore have plenty of opportunities to build interpersonal 
relationships and learn to engage in prosocial behavior such as helping and sharing in 
order to facilitate these relationships.  
 While some findings were unexpected, the results of the current study could 
have important implications. More emotional children were shown to perform more 
poorly on theory-of-mind tasks, a finding that is supported by previous research 
showing that children who display angry or negative emotions more often have lesser 
social cognitive abilities and prosocial responding (Denham, 1986). It is important to 
investigate this relationship further to understand why it is so. It is possible that these 
children have greater difficulty relating to others and taking their perspectives, and 
have more volatile social interactions, and it is important that parents and teachers 
find ways to accommodate these children to facilitate their social and cognitive 
growth. Peer relations are a crucial part of children’s healthy social and cognitive 
development, therefore the findings on how certain temperament dimensions relate to 
prosocial behavior are important as well. It makes sense that more prosocial children 
would be better-liked by peers because of their willingness to help, comfort, and 
share, and therefore it is important to know what types of temperaments facilitate and 
inhibit this type of behavior. Based on the findings of the current study showing that 
shyness is negatively related to prosocial behavior while activity is positively related 
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to prosocial behavior, it would be wise for parents and teachers to take steps to 
encourage and help shy children in their interactions with peers, and to embrace the 
busyness of more active children. Temperament and social environments interact in 
complex ways to produce behavior (Xu, Zhu, & Chen, 2002), so it is important for 
preschool classrooms and home environments to adapt to children’s temperaments in 
order to facilitate each child’s unique needs and promote his or her social and 
cognitive development.  
 It is important to take into account various limitations when interpreting the 
findings of the current study. First, the current study involved a small sample size, 
with virtually no variation in parents’ education levels and children’s ethnic 
backgrounds. Therefore, the representativeness of the sample could be called into 
question. It was also impossible to determine whether children’s theory of mind 
might vary with parents’ varying education levels, something that could be explored 
in future studies. The positive correlation between birth order and sociability, and the 
negative correlation between birth order and prosocial behavior were marginally 
significant, and perhaps with a larger sample size these relationships would become 
clearer. Previous findings on the nature of birth order and temperament have been 
mixed, and depend largely on the types of temperament measures being used as well 
as the age group being studied (Beck, Burnet, Vosper, 2006; Kerestes, 2006; 
Howarth, 1982), but it would be interesting to investigate further birth order’s role in 
prosocial behavior.   
 An additional limitation of the current study is that the two preschools studied 
were very similar. While one was larger than the other, both had similar populations 
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of preschoolers and parents. Because both schools had similar tuitions, parents’ 
education levels were also very similar at the two schools, and it can be assumed that 
socio-economic statuses (SES) were quite high for all subjects. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to compare high- and low-SES populations, and how this might moderate 
development of theory of mind and prosocial behavior. Also, not all children in the 
current study spent an equal amount of time in the classroom; some only attended 
preschool a small number of days each week, and/or only went for half the day. This 
was not recorded in the current study, but it would be interesting for future studies to 
investigate whether the amount of time spent in the preschool setting has an effect on 
the development of theory of mind and prosocial behavior.  
 Another possible limitation of the current study is the type of measure used for 
prosocial behavior. The current study used a 10-item questionnaire adapted from 
Weir, Stevenson, and Graham’s (1980) 20-item Prosocial Behavior Questionnaire for 
teachers. It could be the case that the adapted questionnaire used in the current study 
was not a reliable or sensitive enough measure of prosocial behavior. Alternatively, it 
could be that theory of mind is not significantly related to prosocial behavior, and that 
it is rather a more specific skill such as affective perspective-taking or emotional 
understanding that has a more salient and significant relationship to prosocial 
behavior. This positive significant relationship between affective perspective-taking 
and prosocial behavior has been shown in the literature (Denham, 1986), and some 
researchers have found that the prediction of social behavior is strengthened when 
emotional variables are examined (Strayer, 1980). Research has also indicated that 
affective perspective-taking and cognitive perspective-taking (such as that involved in 
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theory of mind) are significantly related, but that affective perspective-taking is more 
strongly related to prosocial behavior (Shantz, 1975).  It seems that affective 
perspective-taking should be taken into greater consideration as its own unique 
cognitive construct with its own measure, and future studies could measure both 
affective perspective-taking and theory of mind to  compare their effects on prosocial 
behavior. 
 A strength of the current study is that the three measures used – Buss and 
Plomin’s (1984) EAS Temperament Questionnaire; the adapted 10-item Prosocial 
Behavior Questionnaire based on Weir, Stevenson, and Graham’s (1980) original 20-
item Prosocial Behavior Questionnaire for Teachers; and Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
battery of seven theory of mind tasks – were assessed by different people. Parents 
completed the temperament questionnaires, teachers completed the prosocial behavior 
questionnaires, and the researcher administered the battery of theory of mind tasks. 
This eliminated the risk that arises when only one method, for instance, parents, are 
used to complete all of the questionnaires in a study – a risk that calls into question 
the possibility that correlations found between variables are due to the fact that the 
same method (parents) was used to measure each factor. This phenomenon is called 
shared method variance, but was not a concern in the current study thanks to the 
different methods used to measure each factor.  
 Overall, the goal of the current study was to investigate two things. The first 
was how the development of theory of mind was related to preschoolers’ engagement 
in prosocial behavior. The second was whether theory of mind and prosocial behavior 
were related to any of Buss and Plomin’s (1984) temperament dimensions. The main 
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hypothesis of the study was not supported. However, the data and results that were 
obtained were interesting and worthy of description and analysis, as temperament was 
found to be a better predictor of prosocial behavior than theory of mind. These results 
also warrant further study to clarify the nature of the relationship between theory of 
mind, temperament, and prosocial behavior, while taking into account other factors of 
interest such as affective perspective-taking, that were not addressed by the current 
study.   
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Appendix A 
Dear Parent/Guardian, 
 
My name is Shannon Funkhouser, and I am a psychology student at Union 
College in Schenectady, NY. I am currently conducting my senior honor’s thesis, and 
I would like to invite you and your child to be part of my project. I am exploring how 
young children’s development affects their ability to understand the mental states of 
others. For instance, does the child understand that another person may have beliefs 
or knowledge that differ from his/her own beliefs or knowledge? I believe that the 
development of this ability to understand mental states may be related to the child’s 
behavior within the preschool setting, specifically the child’s social behavior. If your 
child takes part in the project, I will ask him/her to watch some stories that I will act 
out with little figurines. I will then ask your child a few questions, such as “Where 
will John think the candy bar is?” Or “Janet really likes cookies…Which snack will 
Janet choose?” Completion of the tasks should take about 15 minutes in total. I would 
like to stress that participation in this project is completely voluntary, and if your 
child does not want to participate, or to finish all of the tasks, then that will be fine. 
Most children, however, do find the tasks to be a fun interactive activity. 
Additionally, I ask for your permission to allow your child’s teacher to fill out a brief 
questionnaire describing your child’s typical sharing and helping behavior in the 
classroom. 
I need to obtain your written permission before your child can participate. I 
would appreciate it if you could fill out the attached permission slip, as well as the 
brief demographic and temperament questionnaires about your child, and return them 
to your child’s teacher as soon as possible. I would like to assure you that all answers 
will be kept confidential, and that no names will be used in my thesis. 
Please return the attached information to your child’s teacher, with whom I 
will be in contact regarding which children have permission to take part in my 
project. You can contact me at any time at funkhous@garnet.union.edu, or my 
professor Linda Stanhope at stanhopl@union.edu. We are more than happy to provide 
further information, and to answer any questions that you may have. Additionally, if 
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you would like to receive a brief summary of my findings in the spring, please 
indicate that on the permission slip, and I will be happy to send them to an e-mail 
address or other contact of your choosing. Thank you so much for your time and 
consideration! 
Sincerely, 
Shannon Funkhouser 
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Appendix B 
Permission Slip 
 
I, ___________________________________________________________, give my 
son/daughter_________________________________________________________ 
permission to participate in Shannon Funkhouser’s project exploring children’s 
understanding of mental states, and also give my child’s teacher participation to fill 
out a brief questionnaire describing my child’s social behavior. I understand that my 
child and I will be free to withdraw participation from this project at any time, and 
that all answers and information will be kept confidential.  
Signature:____________________________________________________________ 
Date:__________________ 
 
If you would like to receive a summary of my findings when the project is complete 
in the spring, please check here _______________. 
Preferred e-mail address: ______________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix C 
Demographic Information 
 
Sex of child (Please circle one):           Male             Female 
 
 
Which of the following best describes your child’s ethnic background?:       
Hispanic/Latino                           American Indian or Alaska Native                              
 
Asian        Black or African American          Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander   
 
White                       Other (Please specify): ________________________________ 
 
 
Child’s Birth date: ______________________         Age of child: ________________ 
 
 
Child’s Birth Order:                 only child                    first-born                 second-born 
 
third-born                 fourth-born              other (please specify):__________________ 
 
 
With whom does the child typically reside? (Please circle all that apply): 
Mother           Father       Stepmother         Stepfather       Grandmother          
 
Grandfather       Other (Please specify): _____________________________________ 
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What is the highest level of education attained by the child’s parents/guardians?: 
Parent/Guardian 1: 
Some high school                              High school diploma                        Some college 
 
2-year college degree                    4-year college degree                       Master’s degree                
 
MD/JD/PhD/Post Doctoral 
 
Parent/Guardian 2 (If applicable): 
Some high school                              High school diploma                        Some college 
 
2-year college degree                   4-year college degree                        Master’s degree                
 
MD/JD/PhD/Post Doctoral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
  62
Appendix D 
Data sheets are the same as those used by Stempler (2009) and Gilman (2010) 
TASK DATA SHEET Order:   
 
Participant ID #:_______________ 
 
 
1. Diverse Desires:                                Score:  
Own-Desires Question: _____________________________________ 
 
Target Question: ___________________________________________ 0 1 
 
2. Diverse Beliefs: 
Own-Belief Question: ______________________________________ 
 
Target Question: ___________________________________________ 0 1 
 
3. Belief-Emotion: 
Target Question: ___________________________________________ 
 
Emotion-Control Question: ________________________________ 0 1 
 
4. Explicit False Belief: 
Target Question: ___________________________________________ 
 
Reality Question: ___________________________________________ 0 1 
 
5. Contents False Belief: 
Target Question: ___________________________________________ 
 
Memory Question: _________________________________________ 0 1 
 
6. Knowledge Access: 
Target Question: ___________________________________________ 
 
Memory Question: _________________________________________ 0 1 
 
7. Real-Apparent Emotion: 
Target-Feel Question: ______________________________________ 
 
Target-Look Question: _____________________________________ 0 1 
 
 
              Total Score: __________________ 
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Appendix E 
All tasks were taken directly from Wellman and Liu (2004; 538-539): 
 
Diverse Desires 
Children see a toy figure of an adult and a sheet of paper with a carrot and a cookie 
drawn on it. ‘‘Here’s Mr. Jones. It’s snack time, so, Mr. Jones wants a snack to eat. 
Here are two different snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like 
best? Would you like a carrot or a cookie best?’’ This is the own-desire question. If 
the child chooses the carrot: ‘‘Well, that’s a good choice, but Mr. Jones really likes 
cookies. He doesn’t like carrots. What he likes best are cookies.’’ (Or, if the child 
chooses the cookie, he or she is told Mr. Jones likes carrots.) Then the child is asked 
the target question: ‘‘So, now it’s time to eat. Mr. Jones can only choose one snack, 
just one. Which snack will Mr. Jones choose? A carrot or a cookie?’’ To be scored as 
correct, or to pass this task, the child must answer the target question opposite from 
his or her answer to the own-desire question. This task was derived from those used 
by Wellman and Woolley (1990) and Repacholi and Gopnik (1997). 
 
Diverse Beliefs 
Children see a toy figure of a girl and a sheet of paper with bushes and a garage 
drawn on it. ‘‘Here’s Linda. Linda wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in 
the bushes or it might be hiding in the garage. Where do you think the cat is? In the 
bushes or in the garage?’’ This is the own-belief question. If the child chooses the 
bushes: ‘‘Well, that’s a good idea, but Linda thinks her cat is in the garage. She thinks 
her cat is in the garage.’’ (Or, if the child chooses the garage, he or she is told Linda 
thinks her cat is in the bushes.) Then the child is asked the target question: ‘‘So where 
will Linda look for her cat? In the bushes or in the garage?’’ To be correct the child 
must answer the target question opposite from his or her answer to the own-belief 
question. This task was derived from those used by Wellman and Bartsch (1989) and 
Wellman et al. (1996). 
 
Knowledge Access 
Children see a nondescript plastic box with a drawer containing a small plastic toy 
dog inside the closed drawer. ‘‘Here’s a drawer. What do you think is inside the 
drawer?’’ (The child can give any answer he or she likes or indicate that he or she 
does not know). Next, the drawer is opened and the child is shown the content of the 
drawer: ‘‘Let’s see - it’s really a dog inside!’’ Close the drawer: ‘‘Okay, what is in 
the drawer?’’ Then a toy figure of a girl is produced: ‘‘Polly has never ever seen 
inside this drawer. Now here comes Polly. So, does Polly know what is in the drawer? 
(the target question) ‘‘Did Polly see inside this drawer?’’ (the memory question). To 
be correct the child must answer the target question ‘‘no’’ and answer the memory 
control question ‘‘no.’’ This task was derived from those used by Pratt and Bryant 
(1990) and Pillow (1989), although it was modified so that the format was more 
parallel to the contents False-Belief task. 
 
Contents False Belief 
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The child sees a clearly identifiable Band-Aid box with a plastic toy pig inside the 
closed Band-Aid box. ‘‘Here’s a Band-Aid box. What do you think is inside the 
Band-Aid box?’’ Next, the Band-Aid box is opened: ‘‘Let’s see - it’s really a pig 
inside!’’ The Band-Aid box is closed: ‘‘Okay, what is in the Band- Aid box?’’ Then a 
toy figure of a boy is produced: ‘‘Peter has never ever seen inside this Band-Aid box. 
Now here comes Peter. So, what does Peter think is in the box? Band-Aids or a pig? 
(the target question) ‘‘Did Peter see inside this box?’’ (the memory question). To be 
correct the child must answer the target question ‘‘Band-Aids’’ and answer the 
memory question ‘‘no.’’ This task was derived from one used initially by Perner, 
Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) and widely modified and used since then (see Wellman 
et al., 2001).  
 
Explicit False Belief 
Children see a toy figure of a boy and a sheet of paper with a backpack and a closet 
drawn on it. ‘‘Here’s Scott. Scott wants to find his mittens. His mittens might be in 
his backpack or they might be in the closet. Really, Scott’s mittens are in his 
backpack. But Scott thinks his mittens are in the closet.’’ ‘‘So, where will Scott look 
for his mittens? In his backpack or in the closet?’’ (the target question) ‘‘Where are 
Scott’s mittens really? In his backpack or in the closet?’’ (the reality question). To be 
correct the child must answer the target question ‘‘closet’’ and answer the reality 
question ‘‘backpack.’’ This task was derived from one used by Wellman and Bartsch 
(1989) and Siegal and Beattie (1991). 
 
Belief – Emotion 
Children see a toy figure of a boy and a clearly identifiable individual-size Cheerios 
box with rocks inside the closed box. ‘‘Here is a Cheerios box and here is Teddy. 
What do you think is inside the Cheerios box?’’ (Cheerios) Then the adult makes 
Teddy speak: ‘‘Teddy says, ‘Oh good, because I love Cheerios. Cheerios are my 
favorite snack. Now I’ll go play.’’’ Teddy is then put away and out of sight. Next, the 
Cheerios box is opened and the contents are shown to the child: ‘‘Let’s see - there are 
really rocks inside and no Cheerios! There’s nothing but rocks.’’ The Cheerios box is 
closed: ‘‘Okay, what is Teddy’s favorite snack?’’ (Cheerios). Then Teddy comes 
back: ‘‘Teddy has never ever seen inside this box. Now here comes Teddy. Teddy’s 
back and it’s snack time. Let’s give Teddy this box. So, how does Teddy feel when he 
gets this box? Happy or sad?’’ (the target question) The adult opens the Cheerios box 
and lets the toy figure look inside: ‘‘How does Teddy feel after he looks inside the 
box? Happy or sad?’’ (the emotion control question). To be correct, the child must 
answer the target question ‘‘happy’’ and answer the emotion-control question ‘‘sad.’’ 
This task was derived from one used by Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, and 
Cooke (1989). 
 
Real – Apparent Emotion  
Initially, children see a sheet of paper with three faces drawn on it - a happy, a 
neutral, and a sad face - to check that the child knows these emotional expressions. 
Then that paper is put aside, and the task begins with the child being shown a 
cardboard cutout figure of a boy drawn from the back so that the boy’s facial 
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expression cannot be seen. ‘‘This story is about a boy. I’m going to ask you about 
how the boy really feels inside and how he looks on his face. He might really feel one 
way inside but look a different way on his face. Or, he might really feel the same way 
inside as he looks on his face. I want you to tell me how he really feels inside and 
how he looks on his face.’’ 
‘‘This story is about Matt. Matt’s friends were playing together and telling jokes. One 
of the older children, Rosie, told a mean joke about Matt and everyone laughed. 
Everyone thought it was very funny, but not Matt. But, Matt didn’t want the other 
children to see how he felt about the joke, because they would call him a baby. So, 
Matt tried to hide how he felt.’’ Then the child gets two memory checks: ‘‘What did 
the other children do when Rosie told a mean joke about Matt?’’ (Laughed or thought 
it was funny.) ‘‘In the story, what would the other children do if they knew how Matt 
felt?’’ (Call Matt a baby or tease him). Pointing to the three emotion pictures: ‘‘So, 
how did Matt really feel, when everyone laughed? Did he feel happy, sad, or okay?’’ 
(the target-feel question). ‘‘How did Matt try to look on his face, when everyone 
laughed? Did he look happy, sad, or okay? (the target-look question). To be correct 
the child’s answer to the target-feel question must be more negative than his or her 
answer to the target-look question (i.e., sad for target-feel and happy or okay for 
arget-look, or okay for target-feel and happy for target-look). This task was derived 
rom one used by Harris, Donnelly, Guz, and Pitt-Watson (1986). 
t
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